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RECENT DECISIONS
CONSTITUTIONAI: LAW-ABSENCE OF CONVICTED DEFENDANT
FRoM HEARING TO SETTLE TRANSCRIPT OF TRIAL RECORD PRIOR TO
APPEAL DOES NOT VIOLATE DUE PROCESS. - Chessman v. Teets,
239 F.2d 205 (9th Cir. 1956). In 1948, petitioner was convicted and

sentenced to death. California law requires an automatic appeal
to its Supreme Court of all trial judgments which result in a
death sentence, CAL. PEN. CODE § 1239 (b) (West 1956), and the
entire record of the trial must be prepared and certified as correct
by the court reporter who stenographically recorded the trial
proceedings. CAL. RULES ON APPEAL, Rules 33 (c) and 35 (b)
(West 1955). The court reporter who had recorded the entire
trial died while preparing the record for appeal, leaving 2,000
pages of shorthand notes to be transcribed and certified for use
at the mandatory appeal. A substitute reporter was appointed to
complete the transcription, and it was certified to be correct at a
post-conviction hearing. Petitioner was not permitted to attend
the hearing although permission was requested. After his conviction was affirmed, People v. Chessman, 38 Cal. 2d 166, 238 P.2d
1001 (1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 915 (1952), petitioner sought a
writ of habeas corpus in the federal district court. The writ was
denied and appeal was taken. Held, affirmed. Due process of law

is not violated if the defendant in a criminal action is not permitted to be present at a hearing for settlement of the transcript
because such hearing is part of the appeal procedure rather than
of the trial.
Although it is a commonly accepted belief that a criminal
defendant in a state court has the right to be present at all
stages of his trial, the cases indicate that this right is subject to
many limitations. Basically, due process requires that the defendant be present only if a fair hearing would be thwarted by
his absence. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934). This
has been interpreted to mean that the defendant is entitled to
hear everything that is heard by the jury, in order to adequately
protect himself. United States v. Johnson, 129 F.2d 954, 958
(1942). Thus his presence is required where it bears a "reasonably substantial" relation to his opportunity to defend himself.
Snyder v. Massachusetts, supra. Some divergencies appear in the
application of this standard. While the defendant must be in
court when the jurors are challenged, Hopt v. People, 110 U.S.
574, 579 (1883), it has been held that a juror may be discharged
in the absence of the defendant, Howard v. Kentucky, 200 U.S.
164 (1906). Similarly, although the defendant has a right to be
present while the jury receives evidence, United States v. Johnson, supra, it is not essential that the defendant actually hear the
(522)
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evidence presented, Felts v. Murphy, 201 U.S. 123 (1906) (deafness), or be present when the verdict is rendered, Frank v.
Mangrum, 237 U.S. 309, 343 (1915), nor is it necessary that the
defendant be present when the jury views the scene of the crime,
Snyder v. Massachusetts, supra. If a pure question of law is
argued in the absence of both the defendant and the jury, the
defendant is not prejudiced by his absence since his opportunity
to defend himself is not affected. United States v. Johnson, supra.
In the absence of a statute to the contrary, a convicted defendant has no absolute right to take an appeal. District of
Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 627 (1937). If the state grants
the right of appeal, it may set its own conditions, McKane v.
Durston, 153 U.S. 684 (1894), subject however, to the requirements of due process of law, Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196
(1948). Due process does not normally require the presence of
the defendant, even in a capital case, during the hearing of his
appeal, Schwab v. Berggren, 143 U.S. 442 (1892), but if at any
stage of the judicial proceedings the presence of the defendant is
necessary to insure a fair hearing, then his presence becomes a
requisite, Price v. Johnson, 334 U.S. 266, 280 (1948). In the
instant case the majority determined that the settlement proceedings were part of the appellate procedure and treated this as
conclusive of the question. 239 F.2d at 218.
In two recent decisions where the defendants requested to be
present at post-conviction hearings, the Supreme Court upheld
the constitutionality of their exclusion on the grounds that the
guilt or innocence of the defendants was not being determined at
these hearings. Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9 (1950); Williams
v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949). However, in neither case did
the defendants claim prejudicial error at the trial which could
affect their chances for release, and more importantly, though
the defendants were not present, neither was the prosecution. The
defendant in the instant case alleged prejudice at his trial, and
since the record was plaintiff's only chance of showing prejudice
on appeal, it appears that his guilt or innocence was being
determined at these proceedings without his presence.
Although the majority in the instant case treated the hearing as
part of the appellate process, it would be more logical and imminently more just to place it within the purview of the trial.
The trial judge conducted the hearing; the trial prosecutor produced and questioned the witnesses; and the witnesses (excepting
the substitute reporter) and others present at the trial testified
from memory as to facts that had occurred at the trial - facts
that were vital to defendant's contentions. The only person
needed to complete the trial setting was the defendant himself.
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Even treating the hearing as part of the appeal process, by the
reasoning of the Price and Cole cases, supra,the particular factual
situation surrounding this hearing demanded the defendant's
presence in order to insure a full and fair hearing as required
by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Daniel W. Hammer

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-LoYALTY TEST OATHS- ILLINOIS
LOYALTY OATH STATUTE SUSTAINED IN ITS APPLICATION TO
TEACHERS. - Pickus v. Board of Education, 138 N.E.2d 532 (Ill.
1956). In June, 1955, the Illinois Legislature enacted section 30
(b) of "An act in Relation to State Finance," ILL. ANN. STAT. C.
127, § 166 (b) (Smith-Hurd 1956 Supp.), which provides that no
state employee, with certain non-pertinent exceptions, can receive
compensation from legislative appropriations until he files an
affidavit under oath stating that he is not knowingly a present
member of, nor knowingly affiliated with, either the communist
party or any other organization advocating the violent overthrow of the government. The plaintiffs were Chicago school
teachers who continued to work after refusing to execute this
affidavit. Plaintiffs' actions for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against enforcement of the statute were dismissed.
On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of Illinois held, in part, that
the statute was constitutional and not in violation of either state
or federal requirements of due process of law.
It is clearly established that the use of loyalty oaths is not unconstitutional in and of itself when used as a means to eliminate
subversives from public office, Gerende v. Board of Supervisors,
341 U.S. 56 (1951); from union office, American Communications
Ass'n. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950); or from city civil service,
Garnerv. Board of Public Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951). Neither do
teachers merit a treatment substantially different from others
classified as public employees. Pockman v. Leonard, 39 Cal.App.
2d 676, 249 P.2d 267, appeal dismissed for lack of a substantial
federal question, 345 U.S. 962 (1952); Thorp v. Board of Trustees,
6 N.J. 498, 79 A.2d 466, vacated because moot, 342 U.S. 803 (1951).
The primary position taken in opposition is that a test oath requirement violates rights guaranteed by the first and fourteenth
amendments - collectively termed by those affected "academic
freedom," "religious freedom" or "freedom of thought and conscience" - on the theory that such an oath limits absolute free-
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dom of belief. However, the use of this type of oath is held to be a
limitation not on belief but on conduct, which is not an absolute
right, but rather one which is relative to the state's power to
regulate anti-social conduct. American Communications Ass'n. v.
Douds, supra. Thus viewed, the use of an oath in eliminating
subversives from certain areas of public interest can be justified
under the "clear and present danger" doctrine enunciated in
Schenk v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
This reasoning is applicable to justify the decision in the instant case. There is no constitutional right to public employment
as such. McAuliffe v. Mayor, 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.. 517 (1892).
Rather it is a privilege with a corresponding duty to the public
including a mandatory qualification of loyalty to the government
as part of the contract of employment. Garnerv. Board of Public
Works, supra; cf. note, 45 ILL. REv. 274 (1952). The state has
the power to guard against its own destruction, Dennis v. United
States, 341 U.S. 494 (1950), and as an employer, it has the right
to inquire into the fitness of its servants, Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485 (1952). Therefore, it is not an unreasonable
means of inquiry nor an unconstitutional limitation on the immunities of the first amendment to make a person choose between
public employment and refusal to take a loyalty oath. Garner v.
Board of Public Works, supra. Neither does a loyalty test oath
become a bill of attainder where it is used as a reasonable standard of qualification for certain jobs. American Communications
Ass'n. v. Douds, supra.
Once the basic power to use loyalty oaths has been established,
a second issue arises as to the permissible contents of the oath.
In the Garner case, an oath denying present, future, and past
membership in an organization advocating violent overthrow of
the government for five years previous to the taking of the oath
as a prerequisite to public employment was upheld along with
the requirement of an additional affidavit stating dates of membership in the event that the employee had ever been a member
of the communist party. The one major limitation upon the contents of test oaths is imposed by due process guarantees: scienter
must be implied where express language does not include it.
That is, the oath must not be applicable to membership in a subversive organization by a person who is unaware of the nature
of the organization. Weiman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
The oath in the instant case is of a much narrower scope than
that upheld in the Garnercase, since it applies only to present and
not past or future membership in the specified organizations. Nor
is it open to the objection of the Weiman case, since the word
"knowingly" is expressly included.
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When the basic use and content of the oath have been established as constitutional, the issue narrows to the procedural
effect of the statute. The immediate effect of refusing to file the
affidavit in the instant case is to automatically withhold the employee's compensation from state funds, although the employee
may continue to work without pay (as the plaintiffs did), and
later may recover the back pay by execution of the affidavit.
Of course, the probable result of refusal to file is to force discontinuance of employment. This peculiar result was attacked on
two grounds. The first was based on the claim that notice and
hearing are essential in order to discharge an employee for
loyalty reasons and that the automatic operation of this statute
thus violates due process. Supporting this contention, reliance
was placed upon Slowchower v. Board of Higher Education, 350
U.S. 551 (1956), which held that the summary dismissal of a
college professor was without due process when he was automatically discharged for refusing to answer questions before a
Senate investigating committee concerning his communist affiliation, and on the Adler and Garner cases, supra, in which provisions were made for hearings or review. However, in Slowchower a hearing was required because there was no substantial
relationship between pleading the fifth amendment before an outside committee and disqualification from public employment.
Moreover, in Adler, the hearings were found to be necessary as
the only way to establish knowing membership in a subversive
organization under the operation of the particular statute involved. Though hearings were given in Garner, supra, the main
ground for discharge was the refusal to execute the oath and
affidavit, rather than the results of any further inquiry. Similarly,
in the instant case, the statute prescribed a standard of eligibility
rather than imposing a penalty, so no hearing was necessary.
Petitioners also attacked the statute on the basis that the use
of an oath under the circumstances was not a reasonable attempt
to avert a substantial danger. The plaintiff contended that since
this oath operates only to withhold pay without discharging nonsigners, no danger is averted by the oath requirement; only an
arbitrary limitation is set down, denying equal protection since
the subversive, as well as the innocent objector, can continue to
work. This argument is partially valid, but fails because by it the
plaintiff is forced into the illogical position of contending that
while discharge would be constitutional, a penalty falling short
of discharge violates fundamental rights.
Guided by the recent Supreme Court decisions mentioned
above, the instant court could safely hold that this statute was
not an unreasonable attempt to eliminate communists from pub-
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lic employment. Whether or not an oath requirement is effectual
when it operates merely to withhold compensation is an issue
which, like the larger question of whether loyalty oaths basically
are wise or unwise, remains a question for the legislature and
not for the courts to answer.
John E. Kennedy

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - POLITICAL QUESTION - LEGISLATURE'S
FAILURE TO REAPPORTION IN COMPLIANCE WITH STATE CONSTrITuTION NOT JUSTICIABLE IN FEDERAL COURTS. - Radford v. Gary, 145
F. Supp. 541 (W. D. Okla. 1956), affd per curiam, 352 U.S.
991 (1957). Plaintiff, a resident voter of Oklahoma, brought
this action to compel the Oklahoma Legislature to make
voting reapportionments as required by the state onstitution. Plaintiff alleged that such failure to reapportion operated
to deprive him of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by
the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution. In
support of this contention, he alleged that the county wherein he
resided and voted had approximately fifteen percent of the state
population, with approximately two percent representation in the
state senate and less than four percent in the state house of representatives. On a motion to dismiss, defendant conceded violation of
constitutional rights, but contended that the question was of a
political nature and therefore not justiciable. The motion was sustained.
It is well settled that the federal judiciary will not interfere in
purely political controversies, i.e., those which are better answered by either the legislative or executive branch of the government.
Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849). The rationale
behind this rule lies in the concept of the separation of powers
among the three departments of the government. However, the
manner by which the courts determine what questions are of a
political nature has always been obscure, since the exact division
of powers within the government is often a nebulous concept, incapable of clear-cut delineation. One authority believes that "the
true basis of a political question is the lack of legal principles for
the courts to apply in their consideration of cases involving certain
types of subject matter, and the commitment of their final disposition to the political branches of the government." Field, The
Doctrine of Political Questions in the Federal Courts, 8 MNN.
L. REv. 485, 513 (1924). Another finds the ultimate answer in the
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line drawn by the constitutional delegation. "The actual delegation
as it has occurred has depended upon men's current beliefs as to
what ought to be delegated, upon their political and social theories
and their notions of expediency." Weston, Political Questions, 38
HARV. L. R.v. 296, 331 (1925) .Neither theory clarifies the problem,
but both indicate a consensus of opinion that judicial discretion is
the deciding factor in determining which questions are of a political nature.
Most state courts regard reapportionment issues as justiciable.
For a recent listing of authorities, see Tabor, The Gerrymandering of State and Federal Legislative Districts, 16 MD. L. REV. 277,
284 (1956). However, state courts exercise great caution in using
judicial sanctions to supplant legislative judgment. Only in instances of gross inequalities will an existing apportionment statute
be held unconstitutional. Watts v. O'Connell,247 S.W.2d 531 (Ky.
1952); Ragland v. Anderson, 125 Ky. 141, 100 S.W. 865 (1907) : On
the basis of separation of powers, state courts have refused to compel the legislature to reapportion even in the face of a specific
mandate of the state constitution requiring reapportionment.
Brewer v. Gray, 86 So. 2d 799, 803 (Fla. 1956) (dictum); State v.
Zimmerman, 261 Wis. 398, 52 N.W.2d 903 (1952). The Oklahoma
Supreme Court, in Romang v. Cordell, 206 Okla. 369, 243 P.2d 677
(1952), has acknowledged the unconstitutionality of the existing
Oklahoma apportionment statute, but declined to furnish a remedy. Consequently, the plaintiff in the instant case had no remedy
within the state and attempted to secure the protection of admitted
constitutional rights by resort to the federal courts.
Precedent for the refusal of the federal court to intervene in the
instant case was established in Colegrove. v. Green, 328 U.S. 549
(1946), where the Supreme Court declined to invalidate on constitutional grounds an Illinois statute governing the apportionment
of federal congressional districts in Illinois. Three justices denied
relief, finding no justiciable issue - and at least determining that
no jurisdiction should be exercised if not indeed holding that no
jurisdiction existed- because there was a want of equity and the
question was of a political nature. Three justices, dissenting, found
precedent for both the existence of jurisdiction and its exercise.
Mr. Justice Rutledge cast the deciding vote. He agreed that there
might be a justiciable issue, but because there was a want of equity
due to the "delicacy" of the federal-state issue, he determined that
it should not be exercised. Thus, a majority denied equitable relief
but a confusing line resulted as to justiciability of the issue. See
Cook v. Fortson, 329 U.S. 675, 678 (1946).
The Colegrove case prevailed where the constitutionality of
Georgia's county unit election system was assailed. The Court re-
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fused to invoke its "equity powers in cases posing political issues
arising from a state's geographical distribution of electoral strength
among its political subdivision." South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276, 277

(1950).
A suit analogous to that of the instant case to compel a state
general assembly to reapportion in compliance with the state constitution was dismissed for want of equity because it had been
brought prematurely, the plaintiff having failed to exhaust his
state remedies. Remmey v. Smith, 102 F. Supp. 708 (E.D. Pa.
1951), appeal dismissed, 342 U.S. 916 (1952). But as to the jurisdictional question, the court interpreted the Colegrove case as relating merely to the exercise of judicial power in the political area
rather than to the existence of such power, and indicated that a suit
based upon the fourteenth amendment could present "novel questions." 102 F. Supp. 708, 710, n. 11.
The dissent in the instant case relied heavily on Dyer v. Kazuhisa Abe, 138 F. Supp. 220 (D. Hawaii 1956), where the court
denied a motion to dismiss upon finding that the Hawaiian territorial legislature had failed to reapportion in accordance with
population changes. The court theorized that the majority in the
Colegrove case had found a justiciable cause but had refused to
exercise its equity power because of the delicacy of the statefederal relationship. Since Hawaii is a territory, the court concluded that it was not bound by the Colegrove case because a
territory is not in any respect an independent sovereignty. However, overtones in the decision indicate that the result would
have been the same even if Hawaii had been a state. The court
felt that the impact of the recent Supreme Court decisions in the
civil rights area has caused the delicacy of state-federal relations to bow to the necessity of recognition and enforcement of
constitutionally protected rights.
The Remmey and Dyer cases may be indicative of dissatisfaction with the traditional view that a reapportionment issue is nonjusticiable, at least where there is obvious unconstitutional discrimination. However, the Colegrove rule has prevailed in subsequent suits involving reapportionment. Radford v. Gary, supra;
Perry v. Folsom, 144 F. Supp. 874 (N.D. Ala. 1956). Moreover,
the memorandum affirmance of the instant case by the Supreme
Court indicates that no departure from the traditional view may
be anticipated despite the dissatisfaction. Such a stand, at least
as in the instant case where there is ample evidence of geographical discrimination with no state remedy available, seems a regrettable counterpoint to recent free-swinging steps by the Supreme Court to end unconstitutional discrimination in other areas,
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), declaring

530
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racial segregation in public schools unlawful; Terry v. Adams,
345 U.S. 461 (1953), eliminating discriminatory restrictions of
the Negro vote in Texas.
In the event that a federal court assumes to adjudicate a case
arising from a state legislature's refusal to comply with the constitutional requirement of fair apportionment, there remains the
problem of forcing adherence to its subsequent mandate. The
federal system has long recognized its inability to coerce a state
executive into performing his constitutional duty. Kentucky v.
Dennison,65 U.S. (24 How.) 66 (1860). Furthermore, presumably
the legislature simply could ignore a writ of mandamus, an injunction, or a declaratory judgment. Rendering the present reapportionment statute unconstitutional may be a step in the right
direction, but the Supreme Court evidently feels that judicial
action would only increase the voter's plight, since it might well
result in at-large elections. See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549,
555 (1946). Accordingly the Supreme Court maintains that the
voter's remedy lies in the hands of the electorate or "the fidelity
of executive and legislative action." Colegrove v. Green, supra at
556.
A possible solution to the dilemma would be to amend the state
constitution by initiative, taking the apportionment power from
the legislature and vesting it in a ministerial board "subject to
the coercive power of the court." Radford v. Gary, supra at 544.
This would preclude the legislature from deciding a question so
dear to its members' permanent stay, a fact which seems to produce inaction. The impracticability of this solution, however, is
self evident: it would entail motivating a lethargic populace, and
doing so in the absence of political stimuli.
It is submitted that the federal judiciary will continue to treat
the reapportionment question as one political in nature and refrain from judicial intervention, even where there is an admitted
constitutional violation and the federal court is the only body
which can grant relief. Judicial discretion will continue to prevent the courts from entering a "political thicket," Colegrove v.
Green, supra at 556, where no practical solution is to be found.
William J. Harte

COURTS - DIPLOMA TIC IMMUNITY - ACTION STAYED WHEN DEFENDANT GAINED IMMUNE STATUS AFTER COURT HAD OBTAINED

JURISDICTION.-Arcaya v. Paez, 145 F. Supp. 464 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
In an action for libel, plaintiff filed suit in a United States district
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court against the Consul General of Venezuela, residing in New
York. Defendant appeared after service and moved for summary
judgment. He claimed immunity from suit on two grounds: (1)
by virtue of his status as consul general, and (2) on the further
ground that the court lacked jurisdiction because he had been
appointed alternate representative to the United Nations subsequent to the commencement of the action and therefore, had become amenable to suit only in the Supreme Court of the United
States, as provided by 61 STAT. 762 (1947), 22 U.S.C. § 287 (1952).
Held, because the evidence was insufficient to establish that the
acts sued upon were performed within defendant's scope of authority as consul general, the court acquired jurisdiction which
was not divested by defendant's subsequent appointment to the
United Nations, but the action would be stayed so long as he
possessed this privileged status.
The jurisdiction of the United States district courts over actions against consuls granted by 28 U.S.C. § 1351 (1952), will not
be barred by claims of immunity on the part of consuls if the
suit is based upon acts which are committed outside the scope
of official duties. Lynders v. Lund, 32 F.2d 308 (N.D. Cal. 1929).
Whether or not a particular person enjoys such status, however,
is primarily a political question. A determination of the question
by the State Department must be accepted by the courts, United
States v. Coplon, 88 F. Supp. 915 (S.D.N.Y. 1950), but where the
issue is raised as an affirmative defense in an action over which
the court has jurisdiction and there is no executive ruling, the
court may make its own determination. Trost v. Tompkins, 44
A.2d 226 (D.C. Munic. App. 1945).
When a court gains jurisdiction over the person of the defendant and subject matter, it is retained until a final judgment is
rendered and cannot be divested by subsequent events. Earle v.
De Besa, 109 Cal. App. 619, 293 Pac. 885 (1930); see also, People
of Porto Rico v. Ramos, 232 U.S. 627. (1914). However, the concept of diplomatic immunity has long been recognized in the
common law of nations as an effective bar to local jurisdiction.
Aside from the treatise of 2 GROTIUS, WAR AND PEACE C. 18, § 9
(1682), this principle found its first tangible expression in 7
ANNE C. 12 (1708). The United States, in accepting the doctrine
in REV. STAT. §§ 4063, 4064 (1875), 22 U.S.C. §§ 252-53 (1952),
relies heavily on the English statute, and our courts have accepted
Lord Campbell's classical exposition of its necessity as set out in
MagdalenaSteam Nay. Co. v. Martin, 2 El. & El. 94, 121 Eng. Rep.
36 (1859). See In re Baiz, 135 U.S. 403 (1890). By virtue of the
Headquarters Agreement Between the United States and the
United Nations § 15, 61 STAT. 762 (1947), 22 U.S.C. § 287 (1952),
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the same privileges and immunities accorded diplomatic representatives to the United States were granted to permanent representatives of the United Nations.
The exemption of diplomatic officers from local jurisdiction is
often referred to as extraterritoriality. Although misleading, the
term metaphorically suggests the status of a sovereign in a state
foreign to him, but more exactly, the status of his accredited
representative who partakes of his sovereign's immunity. The
true rationale of diplomatic immunity, however, is found in the
practical considerations of statesmanship and not the subtleties
of political theory. "Now the reason of the immunity has been
shown to arise from the necessity of mutual intercourse ....
Comity is the basis of much of International Law and custom is
the very life of the common law of nations." Letter from Secretary of State to Secretary of Commerce and Labor, MS. DEPT.
OF STATE, 288 DOMESTIC LETTERS 544 (1906). It is this voluntary
recognition and enforcement of diplomatic immunity which maintains international reciprocity.
The instant case presents no opportunity for criticism of this
principle nor a departure from it, but its peculiar factual situation
may call into question the wisdom of the HeadquartersAgreement, supra, wherein the United States generously accorded full
diplomatic privileges and immunities to officials and permanent
representatives of the United Nations. Significantly, the provisions of the United Nations Charter asked immunity only from
suits arising from acts performed within the scope of official
duties. See U. N. CHARTa art. 105, 59 STAT. 1053 (1945).

In Earle v. De Besa, supra, a California court, in a case similar
to the instant one, having acquired jurisdiction over the defendant
in a civil action, refused to dismiss the action although at the time
of trial the defendant possessed the status of Vice-Consul of
Peru, and as such was amenable to suit only in the federal courts
under 36 STAT. 1160 (1911), now 28 U.S.C. § 1351 (1952). The
court distinguished this situation from that in which the defendant possessed immune status prior to and during the commencement of the action, and found that the principles of international
comity were not applicable. This thesis may find analogous support in REV. STAT. §§ 4065, 4066 (1875), 22 U.S.C. § 254 (1952),
which states that the immunity provisions are inapplicable to
inhabitants of the United States who contracted debts before
entering the service of an accredited ambassador thereby gaining immunity from civil suit. Although the instant case differs
from the De Besa case in that the present action was stayed so
long as the defendant retained his immune status, the court followed the De Besa rationale in upholding its jurisdiction, but
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found that principles of international comity prohibited adjudication. However, the two cases are distinguishable, for in the De
Besa case the subsequently acquired status of the defendant
rendered him only partially immune from civil suit, while in the
instant case the defendant was rendered completely immune.
'It would be undesirable to suggest any further curtailment of the
immunities granted, but it is in no way repugnant to an international consciousness to demand respect and subjection to local
law which is not in direct opposition to these principles. Time
and politics may have worked effectively against any change in
the HeadquartersAgreement, supra, but they do not stand in the
way of interpretation of the principles of international comity.
The court's hesitation and solution in the instant case may be
criticized as one following the only available avenue of decision
and amounting to a mere nullity in effect: the defendant can
leave the country before he loses his status, thereby leaving
plaintiff with a worthless default judgment. In the practical interests of international comity it is better to resolve such problems through the diplomatic channels of state rather than the
compulsory judicial process. However, when the courts of a nation are faced with such immediacy and fluctuation in international relations as are the courts of the United States, some
degree of assurance must be given those entitled to adjudication
of their disputes.
Patrick F. McCartan

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - APPEAL mN FORMA PAUPERIS -TRIAL
COURT'S DENIAL FINAL IN ABSENCE OF BAD FAITH. - United

States v. Johnson, 238 F.2d 565 (2d Cir. 1956), judgment
vacated per curiam, 352 U.S. 565 (1957). Petitioner, convicted of a criminal offense in a United States district court,
petitioned the court for leave to appeal in forma pauperis, seeking appointment of counsel and a free transcript of the trial
record in order to appeal errors allegedly committed during the
trial. The petition was rejected on the grounds that the appeal
was frivolous and in bad faith. A similar petition subsequently
was presented to and dismissed by the court of appeals. In the
absence of proof that the action taken by the trial court was in
bad faith and without warrant, district court denial of an appeal
in forma pauperis is final and conclusive, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915
(a) (1952).
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Appeal in forma pauperis is made available in the federal courts
by 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (a) (1952), with the qualification that, "an
appeal may not be taken in forma pauperis if the trial court certifies in writing that it is not taken in good faith." An appeal in
good faith is one in which there is a substantial question or one
which has merit and is not frivolous. United States v. Durham,
130 F. Supp. 445 (D.D.C. 1955). An appeal in forma pauperis is
not a right but a privilege, and it is not a violation of due process
if denied. Clough v. Hunter, 191 F.2d 516 (10th Cir. 1951). If,
however, it can be shown that the trial court's refusal of such
an appeal was itself made in bad faith and without warrant, the
appellate court will grant aid despite the trial court's certification that the petitioner's appeal is pursued in bad faith. Wells v.
United States, 318 U.S. 257 (1943); Higgins v. Binns, 204 F.2d 327
(9th Cir. 1953).
In rejecting the petition in the instant case the court reasoned
that it was within the power of Congress to authorize the trial
judge to decide whether an appeal is substantial, and in the absence of proof that his determination was without basis or in bad
faith his denial is final. The petitioner was not being punished
because of his poverty, but rather he was being denied the assistance requested because he had been convicted by a court of
proper jurisdiction, and the legislature had not seen fit to make
further aid available to him. Other federal circuits confronted
with this question have reached the same conclusion. In re Mitchell, 230 F.2d 729 (9th Cir. 1956); Bareij v. Ford Motor Co., 230
F.2d 729 (9th Cir. 1956); Bernstein v. United States, 195 F.2d 517
(4th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 980 (1952).
The court in the instant case distinguished Griffin v. Illinois,351
U.S. 12 (1955), on the ground that the Supreme Court there
was dealing with an appeal assumed to be meritorious, whereas
the case at bar concerned an appeal deemed to be frivolous.
In dissent, Judge Frank, relying on the opinion of the Supreme
Court in Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), stated that the
Griffin case does apply to the federal system through the Fifth
Amendment; its prohibition of discrimination against the poor on
appeal (once the opportunity to appeal has been extended)
makes it applicable to the present problem with the result that
the certification of the trial court should not be conclusive and
that further aid should be extended.
In the Griffin case, petitioners convicted in the Illinois courts
subsequently attempted to appeal pursuant to the Illinois statute,
but a free transcript was not provided because no federal or state
constitutional questions were involved. Being without financial
means to obtain a transcript, petitioners were unable to adequate-
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ly appeal their conviction. The Supreme Court indicated that
there was no meaningful distinction between the rights of the
indigent when on trial and when on appeal, and held that due
process and equal protection of the law required that there
be no denial of the right to appeal because of lack of means to
provide a transcript. State courts following this decision have
waived the required appeal bond for an indigent, Barber v.
Gladden, 298 P.2d 986 (Ore. 1956), and have granted aid to an
indigent convicted of burglary where it previously had been
available only to those sentenced to death or life imprisonment,
People v. Jackson, 2 Misc.2d 521, 152 N.Y.S.2d 893 (County Ct.
1956). However, in United States v. Sanders, 142 F. Supp. 638
(D.Md. 1956), the court refused to apply the rule of the Griffin
case to the case before it because, inter alia, it concerned rights
under state rather than federal law.
The application of the prohibition of discrimination against indigent petitioners to the present case by Judge Frank, in dissent,
brought into question the meaning and effect of 28 U.S.C. § 1915
(a) (1952). He noted that the courts previously had decided that
the certification was not final when bad faith and action without
warrant by the trial judge could be shown to an appellate court.
However, the petitioner must show that the courts has abused its
discretion, and it will often be impossible to do so without a
transcript. If the defendant cannot afford the cost of a transcript, he may be denied the benefit of a review of his case where
review otherwise would be available. Judge Frank stated that
this result is a discrimination of the same type that the Griffin
case prohibits. The dissent further contended that petitioner was
entitled to appointment of counsel to aid in redrafting his petition to the appellate court, through a record obtained in the
manner described in Miller v. United States, 317 U.S. 192 (1942),
or by a transcript supplied by the court. The appellate court
then could make an informed determination of the propriety of
the trial court's certification of bad faith. Although this aid would
increase the cost of judicial administration, in the opinion of
Judge Frank the nature of our government requires assumption
of this expense.
By virtue of the previous decisions holding aid in forma pauperis
to be a privilege rather than a right, the conclusion of the majority
is logically correct. However, the dissent has cogently pointed out
that the majority interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (a) (1952) involves the same discrimination against the petitioner already determined to violate the due process and equal protection provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment when arising in the state
courts. Therefore, it is submitted that the decision that a
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certification of bad faith is binding unless impeached cannot
stand, unless due process for the federal courts is to mean something less than the due process required of the states.*
William D. Bailey, Jr.
*Subsequent to the completion of this writing, the Supreme Court of
the United States vacated the judgment in a per curiam opinion, 352 U.S.
565 (1957), thus reaching the result the writer indicated would be proper.

EVIDENCE-ADMISSIBILITY OF ORAL CONFESSIONS PROCURED BY
FEDERAL OFFICERS PRIOR TO ARRAIGNMENT. Rettig v. United

States, 239 F.2d 916 (D.C. Cir. 1956). At 7:30 on a Sunday
morning, shortly after she had reported to police that her husband
had been stabbed to death, defendant was placed under arrest
and taken to police headquarters. From the time of arrest until
8:30 that evening, defendant was intermittently questioned and
given lie detector tests. She then was allowed to sleep until
sometime between midnight and 3:00 A.M. Monday when she
was awakened and again questioned for about an hour, during
which time she allegedly made an oral confession admitting the
crime. She was not presented before a committing magistrate until
11:45 Monday morning. Prior to this time, defendant was not
advised of her right to counsel or instructed that anything she
said could be used against her. She was indicted, tried and
found guilty of second-degree murder. During the course of the
trial, police testimony concerning the alleged confession was
admitted into evidence over defendant's objection that it was
inadmissible under the McNabb rule of exclusion of confessions
obtained during illegal detention. On appeal, the United States
Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit, sitting en banc,
reversed and remanded the case on the ground that refusal to
exclude the alleged confession was prejudicial error. The court
was divided in its reasoning. Four judges held that illegal detention alone sufficed to render the confession inadmissible under the
McNabb rule. Two of these four also found that the evidence
showed that the confession was involuntary. Five judges held that
the McNabb rule also required that the confession be induced by
the illegal detention. Two of these five found such inducement,
while the other three, dissenting, found neither inducement nor
illegal detention. Federal court exclusion of criminal confessions
obtained before timely arraignment is limited to cases where the
confession was in some way induced by the illegal detention.
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Prior to the decision of McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332
(1943), the only test used to determine the admissibility of confessions was their voluntary or involuntary nature. Purpura v.
United States, 262 Fed. 473 (4th Cir. 1919). Delay in arraignment
was only one factor to be considered in the determination of the
character of the confession. In the McNabb case, supra, the
Supreme Court made this factor of delay the foundation of an
additional rule of exclusion in the federal courts, grounded not
upon constitutional requirements, but upon the power of the
Supreme Court to supervise the administration of criminal procedure in the federal courts. In that case, the confessions of the
defendants were found to have been made during a detention that
violated the federal statutes [now replaced by FnD. R. Cnmv. P.
5 (a) ] requiring prompt commitment without unnecessary delay,
and having been induced by such illegal detention, the confessions
were held inadmissible as evidence. McNabb v. United States,
supra. However, it was not indicated whether or not inducement
was a necessary requirement under the rule.
The resultant confusion was compounded in Mitchell v. United
States, 322 U.S. 65 (1944), in which Mr. Justice Frankfurter,
again speaking for the Court, stated, at 67: "Inexcusable detention for the purpose of illegally extracting evidence from an
accused, and the the successful extraction of such inculpatory
statements by continuous questioning for many hours under psychological pressure, were the decisive features in the McNabb
case which led us to rule that a conviction on such evidence could
not stand." As a result of this broad dicta, some lower courts held
that the McNabb rule added only the element of psychological
pressure inducing the confession to the tests of physical coercion
in determining the voluntary character of the confession. Brinegar v. United States, 165 F.2d 512 (10th Cir. 1947) aff'd, 338 U.S.
160 (1949).
In 1948, the Supreme Court again interpreted the McNabb rule,
this time in the light of the Mitchell case. In Upshaw v. United
States, 335 U.S. 410 (1948), the Court pointed out that: "The
Mitchell case ... reaffirms the McNabb rule that a confession is
inadmissible if made during illegal detention due to failure
promptly to carry a prisoner before a committing magistrate, whether or not the 'confession is the result of torture, physical or psychological.

.

.

.

'"

335

U.S. at 413.

While this statement seems to rule out any requirement of inducement, other statements contained in the opinion tend to
indicate that the decision was based upon the peculiar fact situation present. In the Upshaw case, the police admitted that the sole
purpose of the illegal detention was to further question the
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accused, the practical effect of which was to induce a confession.
The Court also pointed out that in the McNabb case, the confessions were induced by the illegal detention. 335 U.S. at 412. Thus,
the Supreme Court stated that illegal detention alone would
exclude a confession, and in the same opinion referred to the fact
that in both the McNabb and Upshaw cases, the confessions were
induced by the detention. The resulting conflict in the lower federal courts, as is evidenced by the four separate opinions in the
instant case, is a logical consequence of the Upshaw decision.
An attempt to embody in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure the rule that illegal detention alone is sufficient to exclude
a confession obtained during the confinement did not succeed.
FED. R. Capa. P., Documentary History, Advisory Committee on
Rules of Criminal Procedure, 13 (1943-1945). Similar legislative
proposals and drafts were submitted to Congress but were defeated by widespread opposition. See 93 CONG. REc. 1392 (1947).
Due to the failure of these attempts and the confusing language
in the Upshaw case, several circuit courts adopted the requirement that the illegal detention must induce the confession before
it will be excluded. The Tenth Circuit in Pixley v. United States,
220 F.2d 912 (10th Cir. 1955), held that the McNabb rule strikes
at confessions made while the accused is being unreasonably
detained for the purpose of extracting evidence from him before
arraignment, or confessions obtained with attending circumstances constituting physical or psychological coercion. Cf. Duncan v. United States, 197 F.2d 935 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 344
U.S. 885 (1952). A series of cases beginning with certain dicta
in Pierce v. United States, 197 F.2d 189 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
344 U.S. 846 (1952), and including Tillotson v. United States, 231
F.2d 736 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 989 (1956), and
Mallory v. United States, 236 F.2d 701 (D.C. Cir. 1956), cert.
granted,352 U.S. 877 (1956), indicated that inducement has been
made a requirement in the District of Columbia Circuit.
However, decisions in the Second and Ninth Circuits have
followed the literal language of the Upshaw case. In United States
v. Walker, 176 F.2d 564, 567 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 342 U.S.
869 (1951), the court stated: ". . . we read Upshaw v. United
States . . .as holding that, although admissions may be in fact

"voluntary," they are nevertheless incompetent, if they are
obtained after the time has expired within which the accused
should be arraigned, as provided by Rule 5 (a). . .

."

The

same view was held in Symons v. United States, 178 F.2d
615 (9th Cir. 1949) (dictum), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 985 (1950).
In recent cases the Supreme Court has indicated that it favors
the view that an illegal detention alone will be sufficient to render
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a confession inadmissible. In On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S.
747, 754 (1952), the Court explained the McNabb rule, saying:
"In McNabb ... we held that... a confession made during [the
illegal] detention would be excluded as evidence in federal courts
even though not inadmissible on the ground of any otherwise
involuntary character." Again in Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S.
443, 476 (1953), the Court explained: "Under the leadership of this Court a rule has been adopted for federal
courts, that denies admission to confessions obtained before
prompt arraignment notwithstanding their voluntary character. . . . This experiment has been made in an attempt to
abolish the opportunities for coercion which prolonged detention without a hearing is said to enhance."
Since it is the announced intention of the Supreme Court to
"safe guard persons against compulsory questioning by law
enforcement officers behind closed doors," United States v.
Minker, 350 U.S. 179, 191 (1956), the opinions in the instant case
requiring inducement are clearly out of line. The traditional
respect which the Supreme Court always has had for the opinions
of the District of Columbia Circuit necessarily should be outweighed by the fact that to require inducement destroys the
McNabb rule and returns this field of criminal procedure to the
status that existed prior to the McNabb case; namely, testing the
admissibility of confessions by their voluntary or involuntary
character. This is precisely the rule that the Supreme Court
intended to change, and since it is a fair and equitable safeguard
against police brutality and secret interrogation, it should be
followed.
Donald L. Very

EVIDENCE-IMPEACHIMENT OF WITNESS-UsE OF MECHANICALLY
RECORDED PRIOR INCONSISTENT STATEM1ENT IN CRImaqnAL IACTION.-

Hutson v. State, 296 S.W.2d (Tex. Crim. App. 1956). Arrested for
drunken driving, defendant sought to establish at his trial, by
testimony of the sheriff, that he was not drunk at the time of his
arrest. The sheriff testified that defendant "acted more like
he was doped than he did drunk." The state sought to impeach
the witness by introducing a mechanically recorded statement
made by the sheriff to the county attorney before the trial, wherein the witness stated he was "damn sure" defendant was drunk.
This evidence was admitted by the court and the jury rendered
a verdict of guilty. Defendant appealed, alleging, inter alia, error
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in the admission of the recording. The Court of Criminal Appeals
affirmed. A mechanical recording of a prior inconsistent statement
of opinion by a witness may be admitted on cross-examination as
evidence for the purpose of impeachment.
The courts have been unanimous in approving the admission of
prior inconsistent statements of fact to impeach an opposing witness, subject to the requirement of materiality. See MCCORmiCK,
EVIDENCE § 34 (1954). The situation is otherwise where nonexpert statements of opinion are involved. Early decisions reveal
the traditional legal prejudice against conclusions drawn by a
non-expert witness. State v. Nave, 283 Mo. 35, 222 S.W. 744
(1920); State v. Davidson, 9 S.D. 564, 70 N.W. 879 (1897); Drake
v. State, 29 Tex. Crim. 265, 15 S.W. 725 (1890). In these cases, the
courts refused to admit the prior utterance to impeach the witness
because it embodied a conclusion: an opinion drawn by the
witness from the facts.
The later cases exhibit a more analytical approach whereby
the courts look beyond the facade of conclusion and consider
the prior statement in the light of its impeachment function.
Some specifically reject the prohibition against opinion. Bates v.
State, 4 Ga.App. 486, 61 S.E. 888 (1908); Crawford v. Commonwealth, 235 Ky. 368, 31 S.W.2d 618 (1930); DeBose v State, 18
Okla. Crim. 549, 197 Pac. 176 (1921). Others merely set forth
a blanket acceptance of prior inconsistent statements for impeachment purposes, ignoring the fact-opinion dichotomy. Massie
v. Commonwealth, 177 Va. 883, 15 S.E.2d 30 (1941) (manslaughter-drunken driving); Zimberg v. United States, 142 F.2d
132 (1st Cir. 1944) (semble), cert. denied 326 U.S. 712 (1944).
Throughout this area, as in the case of prior inconsistent statements of fact, there persists the requirement of materiality.
Commonwealth v. Jackson, 281 S.W.2d 891 (Ky. 1955), reversed
on other grounds, 296 S.W.2d 472 (Ky. 1956).
California, since 1872, has by statute provided: "A witness
may also be impeached by evidence that he has made, at
other times, statements inconsistent with his present testimony . . . ." CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE ANN. § 2052 (West 1955).
By virtue of CAL. PEN. CODE ANN. § 1102 (West 1955), this section
is made applicable to criminal proceedings. Recent cases have
tended to construe this act as permitting the admission of prior
inconsistent statements of opinion for impeachment purposes.
People v. Brazil, 53 Cal.App. 2d 596, 128 P.2d 204 (1942)
(semble); People v. Raven, 44 Cal. 2d 523, 282 P.2d 866, 867 (1955)
(dictum).
New York has a statute of more recent date, 1937, which is
comparable to the California Act. It provides:
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In addition to impeachment in the manner now permitted by law,
any party may introduce proof that a witness has made a prior
statement inconsistent with his testimony, irrespective of the fact
that the party has called the witness or made the witness his own,
provided that such prior inconsistent statement was made in any
writing by him subscribed or was made under oath. N.Y. CODE
Cana. PRoc. § 8-a.

While the New York act readily lends itself to an interpretation
admitting prior inconsistent statements of opinion, the New York
Court of Appeals has rejected this interpretation. See People v.
Cannizzaro, 1 N.Y.2d 167, 134 N.E.2d 206 (1956).
The Texas courts have long resisted the impetus of the trend
toward admissibility of prior inconsistent statements of opinion.
Drake v. State, supra. (1890); Sapp v. State, 80 Tex. Crim. 363,
190 S.W. 489 (1916); Shannon v. State, 118 Tex. Crim. 505, 38
S.W.2d 785 (1931); McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE § 35, n. 13 (1954). In
the case of Flowers v. State, 150 Tex. Crim. 467, 202 S.W.2d 462
(1947), a departure from this long standing view seemingly is
perceptible. The court therein permitted a witness to be impeached by a prior inconsistent statement concerning the question
of drunkenness of the defendant. Moreover, the same issue of
drunkenness was presented in the instant case; and, although the
prior statements were classified as opinion, they were admitted
without consideration of the rule against admitting prior inconsistent statements of opinion. 296 S.W.2d at 248. A statement relating to the condition of drunkenness necessarily would seem to
be a conclusion. However, closer inspection indicates that perhaps
all that may be involved is a short-hand expression of fact. While
this question as yet remains untouched by the Texas courts, logic
would favor the former interpretation.
The court in the instant case concerned itself primarily with
the medium used to preserve the statement in question. The state
here used a mechanical device to impeach the witness. Questions
as to the use of mechanical devices have involved such controversial matters as lie-detecting and wire-tapping. Weiss v.
United States. 308 U.S. 321 (1939) (wire-tapping); Frye v.
United States, 293 Fed. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (lie-detecting);
State v. Lowry, 163 Kan. 622, 185 P.2d 147 (1947) (lie-detecting).
Constitutional objections to the admission of the recorded testimony were raised but not considered by the majority on the
motion for rehearing. However, these objections constitute the
main thrust of the dissent, i.e., no opportunity for cross-examination; statement by a person not under oath; statement is hearsay;
no opportunity to observe demeanor of the witness and no confrontation of the accused by the witness. 296 S.W.2d at 250. While
these objections might be well taken in a case where the speaker
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or the party spoken to was not present at the trial, they are
unjustified in the case at bar, for here the speaker was present,
under oath, and available for questioning. The objection of
hearsay is inapplicable because of this availability for crossexamination. Furthermore, ample opportunity was afforded to
observe the demeanor of the witness and to effect confrontation.
Finally, these objections should fail because of the rule that prior
inconsistent statements are not to be considered by the jury as
substantive evidence, but pertain solely to impeachment of the
witness. People v. Bishop, 270 App. Div. 133, 58 N.Y.S.2d 711
(2d Dept. 1945); Carroll v. State, 143 Tex. Crim. App. 269, 158
S.W.2d 553 (1942); 3 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE 1018 (3d ed. 1940).
In sum, assuming the prior inconsistent statement to be one of
opinion, the principal case does not represent a substantive extension of the trend toward admitting prior inconsistent statements of opinion. It is merely an innovation in the means employed to accomplish impeachment of a witness. The means are
reasonable and do not subject the parties to injustice. Indeed,
mechanical recordings are more reliable than the fading human
memory. To this should be added the caveat that the utilization
of these devices must be cautious and wary, since recordings,
whether wax, tape or wire, readily lend themselves to clandestine
editing. Untampered with, they represent another step in the
direction of a fairer trial. It must be concluded that the use of
mechanical recordings to impeach a witness via a prior inconsistent statement is within the purview of the rationale advanced
in favor of admitting such statements at all-the more complete
ascertainment of the truth.
William C. Rindone, Jr.

INKEEPERs-DUTY TO GUESTS-LIABILITY FOR SERVANT'S TORTIOUS CONDUCT ON BASIS OF IMPLIED CONTRACT.-Crawford v.

Hotel Essex Boston Corp., 143 F. Supp. 172 (D. Mass. 1956).
Plaintiff, a guest of the hotel operated by the defendant corporation, was questioned by the house detective concerning
registration. After a heated exchange of words, the detective
ordered plaintiff to wait while he checked on another guest.
Plaintiff ignored the order and proceeded. to his room. A few
minutes later in an upstairs hallway, the detective reapproached
plaintiff and, without making any effort to eject him from the hotel,
struck him, causing severe injuries. The case was tried on a
tort theory and the detective was found by the jury to have
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acted within the scope of his employment. Verdict was rendered
for the plaintiff. Defendant moved for judgment n.o.v. Held,
motion denied. Although, as a matter of law, the detective may
have acted outside the scope of his employment, the defendant
is liable for consequential damages resulting from a breach of
the contractual obligation of an innkeeper that his servants
shall protect his guests from harm.
An innkeeper may be liable as a master for a servant's
tortious conduct. Relatively few cases have resulted in holding an
innkeeper liable under respondeat superior for an attack on a
guest by his servant, although this basis of liability is often
mentioned. See, e.g., Cary v. Hotel Rueger, Inc., 195 Va. 980, 81
S.E.2d 421 (1954) (servant shoots guest). But cf. Emmke v.
De Silva, 293 Fed. 17 (8th Cir. 1923) (imputation of unchastity).
An innkeeper may be liable for his own negligence in employing
the person who commits the assault. Rahmel v. Lehndorff, 142
Cal. 681, 76 Pac. 659, 661 (1904) (dictum); see MECHEM, AGENCY §
403 (4th ed. 1952).
The decision in the instant case takes leave of tort theories;
in the words of the court, "Strictly the suit sounds in contract,
rather than in tort. . . ." 143 F. Supp. at 174. The same result
would have obtained had the jury's determination that the
detective acted within the scope of his employment been allowed
to stand. The opinion that a contractual right existed was based
on Bryant v. Rich, 106 Mass. 180 (1870), aff'd sub nom., Vannevar
v. Bryant, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 41 (1874) (removal denied), and
Frewenv. Page, 238 Mass. 499, 131 N.E. 475 (1921). In Bryant v.
Rich, supra, defendants were common carriers and the plaintiff
was a passenger upon their steamboat. Plaintiff suffered a beating
from defendants' employees and brought his action in tort. The
case was decided similarly to the instant case, the court holding
that a contractual duty on the part of the common carrier wherein
his servants shall not mistreat a guest had been breached.
Liability of innkeepers on a contractual basis seems to have
arisen from the common carrier cases. See, e.g., Frewen v. Page,
supra at 477, citing Bryant v. Rich, supra. On the other hand, it
has been pointed out that the duty of innkeepers with regard to
the guest's safety has never been as rigorous as that of common
carriers. Clancy v. Barker, 131 Fed. 161, 165 (8th Cir. 1904);
2 CooiEy, TORTS 1343 (3d ed. 1906).
The opinion that a contractual duty does exist is not without
support in other jurisdictions; yet the view taken by the principal
case is not accepted by all courts which have considered the
issue. Differences in opinion have been sharp. Compare CIancy
v. Barker, 71 Neb. 83, 98 N.W. 440 (1904), affd on rehearing,71
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Neb. 91, 103 N.W. 446 (1905), with Clancy v. Barker, 131 Fed.
161 (8th Cir. 1904); and Mayo Hotel Co. v. Danciger, 143 Okla.
196, 288 Pac. 309, 312 (1930), with Ledington v. Williams, 257 Ky.
599, 78 S.W.2d 790, 792 (1935).
Until the beginning of this century, there seem to have been
no cases holding the innkeeper liable for breach of a contract
under facts similar to the instant case. The opinion of Clancy v.
Barker states, 131 Fed. at 169:
At that time [19041 no court had ever held, so far as our research
and the authorities cited by council have disclosed the decisions, that
the contract of an innkeeper was to insure the safety of the person
of his guest against the negligent or willful acts of his servants
without the scope of their employment.

A trend toward contract recovery is discernible; the principal
case represents the most recent extension. See Clancy v Barker,
71 Neb. 83, 98 N.W. 440 (1904), af'd on rehearing, 71 Neb. 91,
103 N.W. 446 (1905); DeWolf v. Ford, 193 N.Y. 397, 86 N.E. 527,
530 (1908); Frewen v. Page, supra (1921); Mayo Hotel Co. v.
Danciger,supra (1935).
The opinions which discuss the contractual obligation are not
always discriminating when defining the duty. The instant case
itself is not clear on this point. A closing statement in the
principal case mentions that, "The gravamen is the failure of the
servants to protect the plaintiff from harm." 143 F. Supp. at 174.
Yet the court, on the same page, quotes Frewen v. Page, supra,
for the statement that "....

this right created an implied obligation

that neither the innkeeper nor his servants will abuse or insult
the guest. . .

."

It seems that the first statement sets forth an

affirmative duty of protection, a breach of which is nonfeasance,
whereas the latter merely states a negative duty to refrain from
injuring a guest, a breach of which would be misfeasance. See
Lehnen v. E. J. Hines & Co., 88 Kan. 58, 127 Pac. 612, 614 (1912)
(dictum); Mayo Hotel Co. v. Danciger, 143 Okla. 196, 288 Pac.
309, 311 (1935) (semble). Another instance where the standard of
duty is uncertain is found in the opinion by the Nebraska Supreme Court in Clancy v. Barker, supra (guest to be treated with
due consideration for his comfort and safety). A duty of the
negative type may be seen in De Wolf v. Ford, supra.
A logical difference in application, depending upon the nature

of the duty imposed, may result in two ways: (1) under the
affirmative standard, from one point of view there may be an
extension of the effect that would be reached under the negative
rule, for the hotel owner may be liable for failure of his servants
to protect guests from injury at the hands of third persons as well
as injury from the servants, (2) from another point of view, there
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may be a narrowing of the effect that would be reached under
the negative rule, for the hotel owner would not always be liable
even for servant-inflicted injuries to guests-liability could only
be imposed if the servant involved were one charged with the
affirmative duty of protection, and if a servant not so charged
should assault a guest there would be no liability since there
would be no violation of any duty to protect. The absence of any
case law positing the second point no doubt is due to the fact
that the affirmative standard will not be found to exist in isolation
from the negative rule, but rather to incorporate the more limited
liability of the negative rule and then to proceed beyond it to
further liability, namely that occasioned by the failure of a
"protecting servant" to protect a guest from a third person. Therefore, only the first point of logical difference in application would
seem to be of practical consequence.
Under that first point, it seems clear that the court in the
instant case need not have gone so far as to say that an affirative
duty existed. Furthermore, the authority relied on by the court
for this view is questionable; no case is cited which states so
broad a duty except Vannah v. Hart Private Hospital, 228 Mass.
132, 117 N.E. 328, 329-30 (1917) (dictum), which is readily
distinguishable.
The court in the instant case paid little attention to the nature
of the duties of the servant who committed the assault. The last
paragraph of the opinion states, 143 F. Supp. at 174: "I believe
the Massachusetts law to be that if the guest of a hotel is assaulted
by an employee, particularly by one whose duties include the
preservation of order, he has at the least a contractual claim for
consequential damages." (Emphasis added.)
The nature of servant's duties has been seen as material when
the cause of action is in tort. Rahmel v. Lehndorff, 142 Cal. 681,
76 Pac. 659, 660 (1904). See also MEcREM, AGENcY § 396 (a) (4th
ed. 1952). It may be that any distinction as to the nature of the
duties is unnecessary when a contractual duty of the negative
type (duty to refrain from injuring guest) is imposed; but when
an affirmative duty to protect is imposed, a distinction may be
quite material. Would all servants, regardless of their usual
duties, be bound to protect guests, at the peril of the innkeeper?
This matter seems generally to have been ignored.
For logical clarity, in considering an innkeeper's liability for
servants' wrongful conduct, a determination ought to be made as
to which standard of contractual duty should apply, and, when
called for, an inquiry should be made into the nature of the duties
of the errant servant. Though the reasoning of the instant case
is something less than precise, the end result could not be other
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than that reached by the court, since the application of either
standard-affirmative or negative-renders the hotel keeper
absolutely liable for torts committed on his premises by his
servants against his guests.
Eugene F. Waye

